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Abstract
Scarfs economy has been a vehicle in understanding stability properties in exchange economies. The
full set of market equilibria and Pareto optimal allocations for this economy has not been analysed. This
paper aims to do that. Firstly, we examine the Pareto optima and we nd three di¤erent classes. Only
Class I exhausts the aggregate endowments of all the goods. Class II and III involve throwing away
partially or totally one good in order to achieve Pareto e¢ ciency. Secondly, we explore the price and
endowment distribution combinations which sustain the di¤erent Pareto Optima as market equilibria.
A Pareto optimum which involves throwing away the whole endowment of one of the goods is globally
stable.
Keywords: Exchange economy; Complements; Stability.
JEL classication: D50; D61.
1 Introduction
In 1960 Scarf introduced an exchange economy with cyclic preferences to highlight the possibility of global
instability of general equilibrium. Scarf showed that for special initial endowment distributions between in-
dividuals in an exchange economy with particular preferences exhibiting complementarity, there is a unique
market equilibrium with equal prices of the goods that is globally unstable. His example has perfect com-
plementarities in tastes between pairs of goods in a three-good and three-individual economy in which there
are equal aggregate endowments of each good. Each good enters the preferences of two individuals, but no
pair of individuals care about exactly the same two goods. This was referred to as an economy with cyclical
preferences. His work had a strong impact on the development of general equilibrium theory, since it was
the rst clear example of global instability of the tatonnement process.
We would argue that Scarfs example is also interesting from an empirical and normative point of view.
In terms of preferences, all individuals have perfect complementarity in those goods that they wish to
consume. But the goods they desire overlap just partially. It is as if any two of the individuals have
something in common but not everything. Several examples can be found in the household environment, or
in the international trade scenario when countries specialise in consumption in di¤erent set of products that
overlap.
Market equilibrium in this exchange economy has been previously investigated with particular initial
endowment distributions. In Scarfs seminal paper, it is assumed that each individual has only the total
endowment of one of the goods that he wants to consume. Later research contributions are still characterised
by special endowment restrictions. For example, Hirota (1981) analyses the equilibrium assuming that the
sum of the initial endowment across goods is equal for each individual and coincides with the aggregate
endowment. Anderson et al (2004) develop an experimental double auction and allowed prices to adjust
under a nontatonnement rule, based on the same endowment restrictions as those imposed by Hirota. A
consequence of focussing attention just on these endowments is that there is a unique market equilibrium
which gives equal utility to all individuals and the prices of all goods are equal.
The full set of Pareto optima and market equilibria with a general individual endowment distribution
for this economy are still unknown. In particular, an interesting issue concerns the characterisation of
the e¢ cient allocations in this general environment and how it is possible to decentralise them as market
equilibria. Scarfs preferences are not strictly convex and also not strictly nonsatiated in all goods. Therefore,
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the second fundamental theorem of welfare economics cannot be easily invoked. Finding the prices and initial
endowment distributions that support the di¤erent types of e¢ cient allocations is still an open research task.
In this paper, rstly we fully characterise the e¢ cient allocations allowing for general endowment distri-
butions. We show that only three classes of Pareto optima arise. There is a single Pareto optimum in which
the e¢ cient allocation exhausts the endowment of all the goods. In all the other cases, the endowment of
one good is totally or partially wasted. We then dene the set of prices and initial endowment distributions
which will decentralise each type of Pareto optimum. Finally we conduct stability analysis.
Specically, the unique e¢ cient allocation which exhausts the supply of all goods and gives equal util-
ity to all individuals can be decentralised using many di¤erent combinations of prices and endowment
sets. Firstly, this e¢ cient allocation can be supported by unequal positive prices for all goods if the initial
endowment distributions are di¤erent for each individual and satisfy a mild set of inequality restrictions.
Particular special subclasses of endowment distributions within this group are of interest. In one special case,
if and only if the endowment distribution of individuals 1 and 2 satisfy a single restriction, this allocation is
decentralised by good x costing twice as much as good y: Secondly we can have equal prices for two of the
goods if and only if just two of the individuals have a similar aggregateinitial endowment distribution in
a sense we make precise below. This case tends to exhibit local stability and it is certainly stable if just two
individuals have exactly the same initial endowment of each good. Thirdly, it is possible to support the equal
utility allocation with three equal prices if and only if the endowment distribution satises the restrictions
introduced by Hirota; heuristically all three individuals have a similar aggregateinitial endowment distri-
bution. His restrictions imply that in equilibrium since prices of all goods are equal, individuals have equal
wealth individuals and they can trade goods on a one-for-one basis. This allows individuals to specialise
in consumption on the goods they want through trade. The stability properties of equilibrium with Hirota
endowment distributions have been discovered by Scarf and Hirota. We give stability results for the more
general endowment distributions.
We next show that the other e¢ cient allocations in which there is one good which is not totally consumed
or is completely wasted can be decentralised if the price of this good is zero, and in terms of the initial
endowments there is a top dog citizen who is relatively wealthy in the endowment of the goods he likes. The
particular e¢ cient allocation in which the good is totally wasted emerges only if one individual is in such
a favoured endowment position that he has the total endowments of the goods that he likes and no trade
occurs in the market. These Pareto corner allocations in which there is one good totally wasted are globally
stable.
The paper is organised as follows. After stating Scarfs preferences, we nd the three classes of Pareto
optima of this economy. In Section 3 we analyse the feasible types of market equilibria. We next dene the
set of prices and initial endowment distributions that can decentralise the di¤erent Pareto optima (Section
4). The stability analysis concludes this paper (Section 5).
2 Perfect Complements: the Scarf Economy
Scarfs economy has 3 individuals and 3 goods. Individual preferences are given by
u1(x1; y1; z1) = minfy1; z1g
u2(x2; y2; z2) = minfx2; z2g
u3(x3; y3; z3) = minfx3; y3g
There is an interlocking set of perfect complementarities in preferences between the three goods. As an
example think of a father, mother and daughter with the three consumption activities being attending
football matches, using perfume, participating in the bridge club. The father may want football match
spectating and bridge club participation in equal proportions but care not at all about perfume. The mother
wants perfume and bridge club participation but has no use for football matches. The daughter hates bridge
but likes football matches and perfume in equal proportions. Any two of the three people have one common
and one distinct desire.
The aggregate endowments of the goods are X = Y = Z = 1, we call this a square economy since there
are equal aggregate endowments of all goods. For convenience we normalise the scale of the economy at 1
unit of each good. Obviously, changing the size of the economy does not a¤ect the nature of the results.
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2.1 Pareto Optima
With the strong complementarities we would expect e¢ cient allocations to involve specialisation in consump-
tion on those goods which individuals wish to consume. For example allocating any of good 3 to individual
1 yields no Pareto improvement. Moreover we nd that there can be two e¢ cient allocations in which one
allocation involves more consumption of one good by one individual (which is of no utility value to him).
But both allocations are e¢ cient.
The set of feasible allocations is given by
F = fx; y; zjxh  1;xh  1;xh  1; x  0; y  0; z  0g
where = (x1; x2; x3); etc. The set of e¢ cient allocations are most easily shown in terms of the e¢ cient utility
distributions. Dene
P1 = fx; y; zj(x; y; z)"F; u1(x1; y1; z1) = 1  a; u2(x2; y2; z2) = a; u3(x3; y3; z3) = a; 0  a  1=2g
P2 = fx; y; zj(x; y; z)"F; u1(x1; y1; z1) = a; u2(x2; y2; z2) = 1  a; u3(x3; y3; z3) = a; 0  a  1=2g
P3 = fx; y; zj(x; y; z)"F; u1(x1; y1; z1) = a; u2(x2; y2; z2) = a; u3(x3; y3; z3) = 1  a; 0  a  1=2g
Thus Ph is a set of feasible utility distributions which favour individual 1 in the sense that as a varies, u1
varies in the interval (1=2; 1) while u2 = u3 vary in (0; 1=2): In this situation we refer to the most favoured
individual as the top dog. Similarly in P2; P3 a di¤erent individual is favoured. The set of e¢ cient utility
distributions is given by
P = P1 [ P2 [ P3
The set of e¢ cient allocations is characterised by three types of Pareto optima. Only the rst type
exhausts the aggregate feasibility constraint. The other cases imply throwing out totally or partially the
endowment of one of the goods
(a) Class I: total exhaustion. There is a Pareto optimum in which the individuals get equal utility
u1 = u2 = u3 = 1=2
y1 = z1 = 1=2 = 1=2
x2 = z2 = 1=2 = 1=2
x3 = y3 = 1=2 = 1=2
and none of the goods is wasted.
(b) Class II: the aggregate endowment of one good is partially wasted. There is an innite number of
other e¢ cient utility distributions which can be reached without consuming the total endowment of one of
the goods. For example set u1 = u2 = a; u3 = 1  a: This is attained by consumptions
xh yh zh uh
h = 1 0 a a a
h = 2 a 0 a a
h = 3 1  a 1  a 0 1  a
Total 1 1 2a
So long as 0  a  1=2 these allocations are feasible and they cannot be bettered. There is a surplus of good
z available but it cannot usefully be consumed by either individual 3 (he does not want it) nor by individuals
1; 2 (since there is no matching remaining amount of their complementary good available).For example if
a = 1=4 e¢ cient utility distributions and consumptions are:
xh yh zh uh
h = 1 0 1=4 1=4 1=4
h = 2 1=4 0 1=4 1=4
h = 3 3=4 3=4 0 3=4
Total 1 1 1=2
In such a case, 50% of one of the goods is wasted. Similarly there are two alternative Pareto optima in which
only half of one good is not fully consumed but in which there is a di¤erent top dog individual:
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u1 u2 u3
1=4 3=4 1=4
3=4 1=4 1=4
(c) Class III: the aggregate endowment of one good is totally wasted. This class is characterised by three
Pareto optima in which one individual gets the total endowment of two of the goods and the third good is
just wasted
u1 = 1 with y1 = z1 = 1;u2 = u3 = 0:
Here 1 uses all of Y; Z which since these are essential goods for 2; 3 means that 2; 3 are restricted to the
utility associated with zero consumption of the goods they care about.
(a)-(c) above dene the only types of Pareto optima. In any Pareto optimum two of the goods must be
fully allocated for consumption, at most one good may have no useful consumption purpose. If two of the
goods were not fully allocated, we could raise the utility of the person who wants those two goods by giving
them the lower amount of whatever is leftover so that worthwhile consumption increases.
In Figure 1 we represent the full set of Pareto optima. The apex shows the Pareto optimum in which all
individuals get equal utility. The upper boundary of the pyramid shows the other two classes in which one
good is totally or partially wasted.
u1
u2
u3
1
1
1
Fig 1 A graphic representation of
the di¤erent types of Pareto Optima
3 Market Equilibria
Initial endowments for h are given by Xh; Yh; Zh: Prices are px; py; pz: Note also that homogeneity of degree
zero in prices implies that we can impose a price normalisation. The two most common are either to set
one price equal to unity (but this assumes that any equilibrium will have a positive price in that particular
market i.e. the numeraire good is not in excess supply in equilibrium) or pi = 11 . Here we use the latter
normalisation.
Initially suppose that all goods are owned by some individual so that, as the aggregate endowment of
each good is unity,
hXh = hYh = hZh = 1
1By contrast, Scarf used an unusual price normalisation: p2i = 1 which, combined with the non-negativity of prices, means
that prices are restricted to the surface of a non-negative quartersphere.
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Demands are given by
fx1 = 0; fy1 = fz1 =
pxX1 + pyY1 + pzZ1
py + pz
fy2 = 0; fx2 = fz2 =
pxX2 + pyY2 + pzZ2
px + pz
fz3 = 0; fx3 = fy3 =
pxX3 + pyY3 + pzZ3
px + py
These are continuous in prices for px; py; pz > 0, satisfy the individual budget constraints with equality and
are homogeneous of degree zero in p: Note that they are also continuous at a point at which just one price
is zero and the other two prices are positive. However they are discontinuous at a point at which any two
prices are zero since some of the demands are not dened at such a point.
Since the aggregate endowments of each good are equal to unity, the excess demands are:
Ex = fx2 + fx3   1
Ey = fy1 + fy3   1
Ez = fz1 + fz2   1
As an algebraic identity we have Walras Law2 . So the three excess demand equations are dependent.
An equilibrium, for a xed initial endowment distribution between individuals is a price vector p such
that there is no aggregate excess demand, and for any good i if there is excess supply at p of good i then
pi = 0: That is goods which in equilibrium are in excess supply are priced at zero. Formally for a given
initial endowment distribution between individuals, an equilibrium is a set of prices pi such that
Ei  0; pi  0; piEi = 0 i = x; y; z
Note that an equilibrium of this economy can never have two prices zero, if for example px = py = 0
then individual 3 will have an innite demand for goods x; y. Since excess demands are continuous (except
where two prices are equal) and satisfy Walras Law, a competitive equilibrium exists (Arrow-Hahn (1971)
for example). We do not know if it is unique or (under tatonnement) stable.
4 The Decentralisation of Pareto Optima
4.1 The Equal Utility Pareto Optimum
Here we have uh = 1=2 and all goods are consumed. To represent this as a market equilibrium it must be
the case that we can nd an initial endowment distribution and prices such that all excess demands are zero
and prices are all positive. This follows because in this Pareto optimum we know that
xih   1 = yih   1 = zih   1 = 0
or equivalently
Ex = Ey = Ez = 0
and hence the prices must be positive.
2Walras Law:
pxEx + pyEy + pzEz =
px(fx2 + fx3   1) + py(fy1 + fx3   1)+
pz(fy1 + fx2   1) =
(py + pz)fy1 + (px + pz)fx2 + (px + py)fx3   (px + py + pz) =
pxX1 + pyY1 + pzZ1 + pxX2 + pyY2 + pzZ2 + pxX3 + pyY3 + pzZ3
 (px + py + pz) = 0
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From Walras law we can focus on just two excess demands:
Ex = fx2 + fx3   1
Ey = fy1 + fx3   1
In fact since the market equilibrium demands must equal the Pareto optimal allocation, we must have
fx2 = fx3 = fy1 = 1=2. The analysis of the equilibrium will be based on these equations.
Again these equations are not all independent and we can impose any price normalisation we like. We
take the sum of the prices as equal to unity. We also select the two equations fx2  1=2; fy1  1=2 with
which to work.
The market equilibrium allocation requires just two equations to be satised, whilst there are two nor-
malised prices and six free initial endowment variables that can be selected. So there will be an innity of
ways of decentralising the equal utility e¢ cient allocation.
Using the price normalisation pi = 1 andWalras Law, an equilibrium giving the allocation corresponding
to the equal utility Pareto optimum requires prices and an endowment distribution such that:
fy1 =
pxX1 + pyY1 + pzZ1
(py + pz)
= 1=2 (1)
fx2 =
pxX2 + pyY2 + pzZ2
(px + pz)
= 1=2
where pz = 1  py   px:
We can interpret these equations in terms of the net trades individuals make in equilibrium. We can
rewrite the rst equation as
pxX1 = py(1=2  Y1) + (1  py   px)(1=2  Z1)
individual 1 sells x to buy the shortfall of y; z below his Pareto optimal consumption level of 1=2: Similarly
for individual 2
pyY2 = px(1=2 X2) + (1  py   px)(1=2  Z2)
Individual 2 sells y and buys the di¤erence between x and z below his Pareto optimal consumption level.
4.2 Supporting the equal utility Pareto Optimum with unequal prices
In the next sections we show the di¤erent combinations of prices and quantities that will support this Pareto
optimum. We start presenting the more general case (equal utility and unequal prices), showing that any
initial endowment distribution which meets some weak inequality conditions will satisfy a general Hirota-
type condition, which we dene below and from which we can infer the equilibrium prices. One particularly
interesting example of this case arises when the endowment distribution is proportionally distributed among
all the individuals, in which case the equilibrium prices are unequal between all goods but are in a xed
proportional relationship. Then we show that the equal utility Pareto optimum is also decentralised by just
two goods having equal prices if the endowment of just two individuals is similarly allocated. Further this
Pareto optimum can be attained as a market equilibrium with equal prices for the goods if and only if the
initial endowments are similarly distributed among individuals in the sense of Hirota.
4.2.1 The General Case
Suppose we take an arbitrary initial endowment distribution Xh; Yh; Zh;= 1; 2 with X3 = 1 X1 X2; Y3 =
1  Y1   Y2; Z3 = 1  Z1   Z such that:
X1 + Y1 + (1    )Z1 = (1  )=2 (2)
X2 + Y2 + (1    )Z2 = (1  )=2
where ;  are exogenously xed numbers in the unit interval.
From the aggregate availability of each good, (2) implies that a similar relation holds for individual 3:
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Lemma 1 If (2) holds for some numbers ;  then
X3 + Y3 + (1    )Z3 = (+ )=2
This endowment distribution leads to a market equilibrium with prices xed at the exogenous values
given by ; : This is of interest since it relates easily to the Hirota conditions and directly generalises those.
Indeed, (2) have the form of a generalised Hirota condition.
Proposition 2 The equal utility Pareto optimum is supported by unequal prices if
X1 + Y1 + Z1 =  (3)
X2 + Y2 + Z2 = 1
where ; ;  are constants with  = 1=2(1   ), 1 = 1=2(1   ) and  = 1       > 0; and 0 <  6=
 6=  < 1:
Any pair of endowment distributions with the same value of ;  will generate the same price equilibrium
with the same equal equilibrium utility distribution. For example the endowment distribution
Z1 = 0:3;Y1 = 0:7;Z2 = 0:35;Y2 = 0:1;X1 = :043;X2 = :591
yields px =  = 0:28; py =  = 0:33: But the endowment distribution
Z1 = 0:3;Y1 = 0:4;Z2 = 0:35;Y2 = 0:1;X1 = :396; X2 = :59
yields exactly the same equilibrium prices and utility distribution.
In fact there is an alternative way of thinking of (2). Suppose that (:::); (:::) are functions of the any
given individual endowment distribution such that identically (2) are satised3 . The functions are just a
convenient algebraic summary of combinations of terms in initial endowments. They are particularly useful
because if we use (2) to eliminate X1; X2 from the excess demand functions then we can write the equilibrium
prices very simply in terms of the functions ;  :
px = 
py = 
These prices solve the equilibrium equations (1). This also tells us that variations in the initial endowment
distribution that keep ;  constant lead to the same equilibrium prices. This means that any and all
endowment distributions at which the computed values of ;  satisfy 0 <  +  < 1;  > 0;  > 0 will
decentralise the equal utility Paret optimum. Any endowment distribution satisfying inequalities (4) below
will do the job.
The requisite inequalities have the form
2(Y1X2   Y2X1)  (Y1 +X2) + 1=2 < 0 (4)
2(Y1Z2   Y2Z1) + (Y2   Y1 + Z2) + 1=2 > 0
2(Z1X2   Z2X1) + (X1  X2   Z1) + 1=2 > 0
2(Y1(Z2  X2)  Y2(Z1  X1) + Z1X2   Z2X1) + (Y2 +X1   Z2   Z1) + 1=2 > 0
3 Indeed values
 =
2(Y1Z2   Y2Z1) + Y2   Y1   Z2 + 1=2
2(Y1Z2   Y1X2 + Z1X2   Y2Z1 + Y2X1   Z2X1) + (Y2 +X1   Z2   Z1) + 1=2
 =
2(Z1X2   Z2X1) + (X1   Z1  X2) + 1=2
2(Y1Z2   Y1X2 + Z1X2   Y2Z1 + Y2X1   Z2X1) + (Y2 +X1   Z2   Z1) + 1=2
will satisfy these conditions so long as the denominator does not vanish.
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There are an innity of endowment distributions which satisfy these inequalities. For example if individuals
have a zero endowment of the good which they do not wish to consume (X1 = 0; Y2 = 0; Z3 = 0 which
implies that Z2 = 1  Z1) the inequalities assume the form
2Y1X2   (Y1 +X2) + 1=2 < 0 (5)
1  Z1(1 + 2Y1) + Y1 + 1=2 > 0
2Z1X2   (X2 + Z1) + 1=2 > 0
2(Y1(1  Z1  X2) + Z1X2)  (1 X1) + 1=2 > 0
These will be satised for similarly low or similarly high values of Y1; X2; Z1:
Proposition 3 The equal utility Pareto optimum can be reached as a market equilibrium i¤ the inequalities
(5) hold.
4.2.2 Proportional Prices
Any endowment distribution satisfying the inequalities will lead to prices that generate a market equilibrium
with equal utility of 1=2:Within this, special classes of endowment distributions will result in special relations
between the equilibrium prices. For example one interesting case might be that in which in equilibrium good
x is say twice as expensive as good y: Suppose that in (2)  = 2 and  = (1  3) so that
X1 + 2Y1 + (1  3)Z1 = 1=2(1  ) (6)
X2 + 2Y2 + (1  3)Z2 = 1=2(1  2)
Then any endowment distribution satisfying these two restrictions can decentralise the equal utility Pareto
optimum with prices
px = ; py = 2; pz = 1  3 (7)
Eliminating  between the two equations in (6) gives the required endowment restriction
(1  2Z1)
(Y1 + 2X1 + 1  3Z1) =
(1  2Z2)
(Y2 + 2X2 + 1=2  3Z2)
For example if we choose a=1/6, then px = 1=6; py = 1=3 and pz = 1=2 and X1 = 2:5   2Y1   3Z1;
and X2 = 2   2Y2   3Z2: Then to be sure that X1; X2  0 we need 2Y1 + 3Z1  2:5 and 2Y2 + 3Z2  2:
This implies Y1  1:25   1:5Z1, and Y2  1   1:5Z2: This gives us a four parameter family of endowment
distributions. But we need Y1; Y2  0 which means we must have Z1  1:25=1:5; Z2  1=1:5: Suppose
we x Z1 = Z2 = 1=3 for example. Then we can choose any values Y1  :75 and Y2  :5 which make
X1 = 1:5   2Y1  1 (for example Y1  :25) and X2 = 1   2Y2  1 (for example Y2  0): The upshot is
an innite number of endowments satisfying :25  Y1  :75; 0  Y2  :5 all of which will give equilibrium
with prices satisfying (6) and equal utility for the individuals. Obviously this could be replicated for any
0 < a < 1=3 and for other values of Z1; Z2
Proposition 4 The equal utility Pareto optimum is supported by proportional prices i¤
X1 + 2Y1 + (1  3)Z1 =  (8)
X2 + 2Y2 + (1  3)Z2 = 1
where  = 1=2(1  ), 1 = 1=2(1  2) and  = 1  3 > 0; and 0 <  < 1=3:
4.2.3 Two prices equal
Another case of some interest is that in which in equilibrium goods x and y are equally expensive. Then two
individuals trading these goods between themselves would be in a similar position of relative advantage. We
can dene the class of endowment distributions which will lead to such equilibrium prices with equal utilities
by setting  =  : the endowment distribution must satisfy
(X1 + Y1) + (1  2)Z1 = 1=2(1  ) (9)
(X2 + Y2) + (1  2)Z2 = 1=2(1  )
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Solving the rst equation of (9) for  = px = py = p
p =  =
(1=2  Z1)
(X1 + Y1   2Z1 + 1=2) (10)
Using this price p in the second equation of (9), the endowment distribution must satisfy
(1=2  Z1)
(X1 + Y1   2Z1 + 1=2) =
(1=2  Z2)
(X2 + Y2   2Z2 + 1=2) (11)
It is also true that if we start from (11), and dene  from (10) we get exactly conditions (9).
The condition (11) is certainly satised if individuals 1 and 2 have exactly the same amount of each good
(X1 = X2; Y1 = Y2; Z1 = Z2). More generally it is also satised when the sum of the endowments of two
goods of individual 1 and 2 is equal and also they have identical endowments of the third good in the sense
that4
X1 + Y1 + Z1 = X2 + Y2 + Z2 = k and Z1 = Z2 (12)
When (9) holds, we can also write5
p =
Z3
(2Z3 + 1 X3   Y3) =
Z3
k + 3Z3
(13)
pz = 1  2p = k + Z3
k + 3Z3
where k = 1  X3   Y3   Z3: This gives a whole family of values of the initial endowment distributions all
of which generate positive prices py = px 6= pz and which generate the market equilibrium quantities
y1 = z1 = 1=2;x2 = z2 = 1=2;x3 = y3 = 1=2
corresponding to the Pareto optimum with equal utilities for all individuals. We can plot these alternative
equilibrium prices as a function of k = 1 X3   Y3   Z3 and Z3:
4 If Z1 = Z2 (11) can be written
X2
2
+
Y2
2
  Z2(X2 + Y2) = X1
2
+
Y1
2
  Z1(X1 + Y1)
5This is easiest to see if X1 + Y1 + Z1 = X2 + Y2 + Z2 = k and Z1 = Z2. From Z1 = Z2 we have Z3 = 1  2Z1:so
p =
Z3=2
(X1 + Y1   2Z1 + 1=2)
Also from
X1 + Y1 = X2 + Y2
X3 + Y3 = 2(1 X1   Y1)
X1 + Y1 = 1  (X3 + Y3)=2
so
p =
Z3=2
1  (X3 + Y3)=2  (1  Z3) + 1=2
=
Z3=2
1=2  (X3 + Y3)=2 + Z3
It is also true under just (11): use the aggregate endowment constraints to eliminate the endowments of individual 1; then use
(11) to eliminate X2 in terms of the endowments of individual 3 and Z2: Replace these expressions in (10) to get (13).
9
Fig 2 Equilibrium Prices p; pz as a
function of k and Z3
For example if k = 0:2; Z3 = 0:25 then px = :263; pz = :474: And so on for other combinations.
Proposition 5 The equal utility Pareto optimum is supported by px = py 6= pz for all goods i¤
(X1 + Y1) + Z1 =  (14)
(X2 + Y2) + Z2 = 
with  = 1=2(1  ) and  = (1  2a):
This is an extended version of the Hirota condition applied just to two individuals.
4.2.4 Supporting the equal utility Pareto Optimum with equal positive prices
Scarf and Hirota use particular distributions of initial endowments and show that with these px = py = pz =
1=3 gives an equilibrium with equal utilities of 1=2: Hirotas class is dened by
Xh + Yh + Zh = 1 for all h
In fact Scarfs endowments, Y1 = Z2 = X3 = 1 and all others zero, are a special case of Hirotas class of
endowments. Hirotas endowments have the strong interpretation that when they hold all individuals have
equal wealth if prices are equal for all goods. We can derive this class of endowments from (2) by setting
 =  = 1=3
X1 + Y1 + Z1 = 1
X2 + Y2 + Z2 = 1
We can then ask what is the full set of initial endowment distributions which make px = py = pz = 1=3
a market equilibrium and which leads to the equal utility Pareto optimum.
Proposition 6 The equal utility Pareto optimum is supported by equal positive prices for all goods i¤ the
Hirota conditions hold
Thus we have shown that a market equilibrium with equal prices for all three goods supports the equal
utility Pareto optimum i¤ the initial endowments satisfy the Hirota endowment conditions. The equilibrium
with equal quantity and prices is obtained when the total endowment, X +Y +Z = 3; is equally distributed
among individuals. On average, every individual has the same power in contracting since every individual
has got a third of the total initial endowment. Each individual endowment is Xh + Yh + Zh = 1 for each
h = 1; :::; 3). Setting the prices equal allows one unit of any good to exchange for one unit of any other good
so eg individual 1 can sell say 1=3 of a unit of X (which he does not want) and buy 1=6 of a unit of each of
Y; Z which he does want.
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5 Decentralisation of Corner Pareto Optima
In the corner Pareto optima by denition one individual has higher utility than the other two who have
equal utility. We refer to the individual who is better o¤ in the Pareto optimum as the top dog. Markets
can ensure that this utility distribution is reached by nding prices and a suitable endowment to ensure that
the top dog has higher equilibrium wealth than the other individuals. Below we characterise the prices and
the exact endowment distribution restriction for each type of corner Pareto optimum. One aspect of the
endowment restriction is that the top dog must have a su¢ ciently large endowment of at least one of the
goods which he wishes to consume.
5.1 Unequal Utility Pareto Optima (Class II and III)
Pareto optimum Class II have the form uh = 1   a; uk = a = ul for h; k; l = 1; 2; 3: If we analyse one case
say u1 = 1  a; u2 = a = u3 the others will follow.
In this case we know that y1 = z1 = 1   a;x2 = z2 = a;x3 = y3 = a with other consumptions being
zero. Generally we think of 1 as being the favoured individual so that a < 1=2 in which case less than the
total endowment of x is consumed at the Pareto optimum. In market terms prices must be such that x is in
excess supply so for this to be reached as a market equilibrium it must be that px = 0. We know that the
total endowment of goods y; z is consumed so in market equilibrium they must exhibit zero excess demand.
So we can take py; pz > 0 and for example normalise the prices so that px+ py + pz = py + pz = 1: It follows
that pz = 1   py: This leaves py as the only price to be determined, and we have two equations that must
hold: the demand for goods consumed by individual 1 must equal 1   a and those by individuals 2 must
equal a. It follows by Walras law that also the demand for individual 3 must equal a.
Individual 1 wants to sell good x and buy a units of good z and y. But good x does not have any value
( px = 0). The net trade condition equivalent to his demands is
0 = py((1  a)  Y1) + (1  py)((1  a)  Z1) (15)
Note that if Y1 = Z1 the individual will not trade at all but will just consume his initial endowment. Also 1
must own initially at least 1  a of one of the goods that he wishes to consume since otherwise (15) cannot
hold.
Turning to the other individuals, individual 2 wants to sell good y and buy good x and z:
pyY2 = (1  py)(a  Z2)
whilst individual 3 wants to sell good z and buy good x and y):
(1  py)Z3 = py(a  Y3)
We can take an arbitrary price py = k; giving pz = (1   k) for any 0 < k < 1 and look for endowment
distributions which will lead to the Pareto e¢ cient consumptions yielding u1 = 1   a; u2 = u3 = a for an
arbitrary a  1=2: The endowment distribution must satisfy the net trade conditions
0 = k((1  a)  Y1) + (1  k)((1  a)  Z1) (16)
kY2 = (1  k)(a  Z2)
(1  k)Z3 = k(a  Y3)
Any endowment distribution satisfying
Y2
a  Z2 =
(a  Y3)
Z3
) (a  Y3)
Z3
=
a  Y2   Y3
Z2 + Z3   a =
(1  a)  Y1
(Z1   (1  a)) (17)
will satisfy these conditions by setting (1  k)=k to be equal to (a Y3)=Z3: In fact there is a two parameter
set of distributions of Y2; Y3 dened by arbitrary values of Y2  a; Y3  a (which then determine all other
endowments in Y; Z as in the above equation) all of which will lead to the prices py = k; pz = (1  k); px = 0
which support the Pareto optimum with the xed value a. Since good x has a zero value at the equilibrium,
its endowment distribution is irrelevant.
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Proposition 7 Pareto optima with utility distributions u1 = 1 a; u2 = u3 = a can be supported with prices
px = 0; 0 < py = k 6= pz < 1 and any endowment distribution satisfying
kY1 + (1  k)Z1 = 1  a
kY2 + (1  k)Z2 = (1  k)a
kY3 + (1  k)Z3 = ka
with k 6= (1  k):
In this case we have py = k; pz = 1   k: Note that the conditions in the proposition are like the Hirota
linear endowment restrictions but involving only two goods y; z: Of course this is because the distribution of
x is immaterial since its price is zero.
To support the corner Pareto optima what matters is the endowment/wealth distribution. In the examples
above individual 1 is like a top dog with most of the endowment. The wealth of individuals 2 and 3 valued at
the equilibrium prices is lower than the wealth of individual 1 valued at the equilibrium prices, since a  1=2
and 0 < k < 1: Note that although the bottom dogs 2 and 3 have equal equilibrium utility, in general their
wealths valued at equilibrium prices di¤er. If k = 1=2 they have equal wealth but if py = k < 1=2 (and so
pz > 1=2) individual 3 who wants to consume x; y has lower wealth than individual 2 who wants to consume
x; z:
A special case of (17) is of particular interest. Suppose that we select the endowments so that
Y2 + Z2 = Y3 + Z3 = a) Y1 + Z1 = 2(1  a)
then the ratio of endowments in (17) are equal to unity. But since these common ratios are equal to the price
ratio between goods y and z this then means that we can take py = k = 1=2 = pz so that the two goods that
have positive value in equilibrium are equally valued. Then this initial endowment distribution gives equal
wealth to individuals 2 and 3 when valued at the equilibrium prices. But each of these individuals is worse
o¤ in wealth than the top dog individual 1:
Proposition 8 Let a  1=2: Pareto optima with utility distributions u1 = 1   a; u2 = u3 = a can be
supported with prices px = 0; py = pz = 1=2 and any endowment distribution satisfying
Y1 + Z1 = 2(1  a); Y2 + Z2 = Y3 + Z3 = a
In equilibrium individuals 2 and 3 are equally wealthy but both are clearly less wealthy than individual 1:
For example setting a = 1=4; k = :5;Z2 = 1=6 gives Y2 = :167; Y3 = :183; Z3 = :033: The point is that for
any a there is an innity of positive but unequal prices py 6= pz with associated individual initial endowment
distributions which lead to the market equilibrium with u1 = a; u2 = u3 = 1  a:
Another special case is that in which a = 0 in which case the Pareto optimum displays extreme inequity:
u1 = 1; u2 = u3 = 0: This can be supported as a market equilibrium only if individual 1 has got all the
endowment of the two goods that he likes, whatever the distribution of the good that he does not want among
the other individuals. Setting a = 0 in (16) gives kY2+(1 k)Z2 = 0; kY3+(1 k)Z3 = 0 which implies that
Y2 = Z2 = Y3 = 0 (since 0 < k < 1 and Yh  0; Zh  0) and so from the aggregate endowment availability
Y1 = Z1 = 1: For example if X1 = 0:3; Y1 = 1; Z1 = 1; X2 = 0; 5; X3 = 0; 2;Y2 = Z2 = Y3 = Z3 = 0
individual 1 has the total endowment of the two goods y; z that he wishes to consume. Then u1 = 1,
u2 = u3 = 0 and no trade occurs. Each individual just keeps his original endowment although for both
individuals 2 and 3 they have no use for one of the goods with which they may be endowed. The prices
py; pz are then irrelevant and can be set at arbitrary levels within the price normalisation.
Proposition 9 The Pareto optimum with utility distribution u1 = 1; u2 = u3 = 0 can be supported with
prices px = 0;and py > 0; pz > 0 is and only if
Y1 = Z1 = 1; Y2 = Z2 = Y3 = Z3 = 0
In this case the top dog interpretation is extremely inequitable: individuals 2 and 3 have zero wealth
valued at any prices whilst individual 1 has wealth 1 again valued at any prices.
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6 Stability Of Market Equilibria Under Tatonnement
The original interest in the economy put forward by Scarf was in the stability properties of the equal price
equilibrium under a tatonnement rule for price adjustment. Scarf showed that with his particular initial
endowment distribution the unique market equilibrium pi = 1=3 corresponding to the Pareto optimum with
equal utilities was globally unstable under the price normalisation that he used. Hirota showed that other
initial endowment distributions also lead to the equal price equilibrium and that for these other distributions
(within the Hirota class but excluding the Scarf case) there was a tendency to local and global stability.
In general for local stability the excess demand functions must be downward sloping in their own price
and the feedback cross e¤ects between markets should be smallin comparison with the own price e¤ects.
Generally we can write the Jacobian of the excess demand functions for x; y as
J =

@Ex=@px @Ex=@py
@Ey=@px @Ey=@py

(18)
so that det(J) =
@Ex=@px@Ey=@py   @Ex=@py@Ey=@px
and trace(J) = @Ex=@px + @Ey=@py: If the excess demand functions are downard sloping in their own price
then the trace is always negative. The condition for the determinant to be positive (and hence for two
eigenvalues whose real parts are negative and local stability) is that
@Ex=@px@Ey=@py > @Ex=@py@Ey=@px
We can think of this as saying that the aggregate of cross market e¤ects (the LHS) should be small in
absolute value relative to the own price e¤ects.
6.1 Stability of Equilibrium with Equal Utility
6.1.1 The General Case
To explore local stability with an arbitrary initial endowment distribution satisfying (2) we can linearise
the excess demand functions around the equilibrium prices px = ; py =  and compute the trace and the
determinant (see Appendix A).
In section 4.2.1 we have shown that in general there are alternative initial endowment distributions which
generate equilibrium with the same unequal prices. Some of these endowment distributions which yield the
equal utility equilibrium outcome are locally stable, others are locally unstable even though the equilibrium
prices are the same (see the Appendix). For example, if Z1 = 0:3; Y1 = 0:7; Z2 = 0:35; Y2 = 0:1 and we take
X1 = :043; X2 = :591 then px = a = 0:28; py = b = 0:33: With these values the determinant of the Jacobian
in a neighbourhood of equilibrium is  :095 and the trace is  :943: The equilibrium is locally unstable since
the determinant is negative-locally it is a saddlepoint. On the other hand if we take Z1 = 0:3;Y1 = 0:4;
Z2 = 0:35; Y2 = 0:1; and X1 = :396; X2 = :591 then again px =  = 0:28; py =  = 0:33 but now the
determinant has a value of :331 while the trace is equal to  1:448: In this case the equilibrium is locally
stable. In the two examples we have given what matters a lot is the relative ownership by individual 1 of
goods y and z: This is interesting since they are both goods he wishes to consume.
6.1.2 Proportional Prices
The ambiguity of local stability extends to the case in which good x is twice as expensive in equilibrium as
good y ( = 2): For example if we set  = 1=6 the trace is equal to
 8  Y2 + 4Z2 + 3:2Y1 + 8:8Z1
and the determinant is equal to
5:4 + 21:6Z2Y1 + 10:8(Y2   Z2   Y1)  21:6Z1Y2
Choosing Z1 = Z2 = 1=3 the trace becomes
 3:73  Y2 + 3:2Y1
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and the determinant
1:8(1  2(Y1   Y2))
The determinant is positive if Y1  Y2 < 1=2 but otherwise is negative: The trace is negative if  3:73  Y2+
3:2Y1 < 0 which is certainly satised if Y1   Y2 < 1=2:
Thus there are examples of the case in which proportional prices can lead to a Pareto optimal outcome in
which goods are fully consumed and all individuals receive utility 1=2 which are locally stable. But in other
cases we have local instability. However there are relatively simple conditions like the relative ownership of
y by individuals 1 and 2 which yield simple stability conditions.
6.1.3 Stability of Equilibrium with two equal prices
If the endowment restriction satises (9) or (11) local stability is uncertain. The appendix shows that we
will tend to have local stability if individual 3 does not have a heavy concentration of the goods he wishes
to consume (x; y) in his initial endowment.
For example if we x Z3 = :25; Y3 = :5; X3 = :3 we have px = py = :357 and pz = 0:286 whilst the trace
t and determinant d are respectively
t =  2:769 + 3:111X2 + 1:444Z2
d = 1:219  1:084Z2   1:355X2
and we can plot these as functions of X2; Z2:
Fig 3. Trace and determinant as
functions of X2; Z2
Here on the line further from the origin the trace is zero whilst on the line closer to the origin the
determinant is zero. Below both lines we have the trace negative and the determinant positive so the
equilibrium is locally stable; between the lines we have the determinant and trace both negative whilst
above both lines the determinant is negative whilst the trace is positive. Thus in either of these second cases
we have local instability.
However adding similarity to the potential endowment wealth of individuals 1; 2 gives more denite
results.
Individuals 1; 2 Have Equal Endowments of z : Z1 = Z2 We know that if Z1 = Z2 (9) reduces to
a restricted form of the Hirota conditions applied just to individuals 1 and 2: the two individuals have an
equal summed amount of good x and y (X1 + Y1 = X2 + Y2 = k) and Z1 = Z2: In this case the equilibrium
is always locally stable if Y2 > Y1 which implies that X2 < X1: This means that the endowment of the
good that they want to sell is greater than the endowment of the good that they want to buy. However the
equilibrium is also locally stable if Y1 < 1=2:
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Two Individuals Have Identical Endowments If individuals 1 and 2 have exactly the same amount
of each good, the equilibrium is always locally stable(see appendix).
6.1.4 Stability of Equilibrium with Equal Prices and Equal Utilities
When the endowment distribution satises the Hirota restrictions we ned a single endowment restriction to
ensure that the equal price, equal utility equilibrium is locally stable. The endowments must satisfy
X2 > maxf1  2Y1   Y2   2X1; (2Y1   1=2)
2X1 + 1:  2Y1 g
which combines a condition which Hirota initially found (under a di¤erent price normalisation for the deter-
minant to be positive) with a condition for the trace to be negative.
6.2 Stability of Equilibrium with Unequal Utilities
If the endowment distributions are such that a top dog individual is in the system, the equilibrium is always
stable for initial conditions which start with one price at its equilibrium value of zero (see Appendix A 2.1).
In fact if one individual is in such a favoured position that he has the total endowment of the two goods he
wishes to consume and no-trade occurs in the market then the equilibrium is globally stable. There is an
innite set of prices that can support this no-trade equilibrium, in which the other two bottom class citizens
are permanently rationed to their initial endowments without achieving any utility. In the other corner
Pareto optima, still there is a top dog citizen but the di¤erence in terms of wealth with regard to the other
citizens is not so remarkable as in the no trade case. The equilibrium that emerges in this case is stable for
any initial conditions starting with a zero price for the good which is in excess supply (see Appendix A 2.1).
Starting with arbitrary initial conditions we show that for equilibria with some trade which have px = 0
and individual 1 as the top dog, the sign of the determinant and the trace are ambiguous (see Appendix A
2.2).
7 Conclusion
Why does this matter? Generally in the literature we view Scarfs example as an important demonstration
that under tatonnement there can be no presumption that competitive equilibrium is even locally stable.
Hirotas work then shows that actually Scarfs result, whilst important, is quite fragile since it depends not
just on a certain type of complementarity but also on a kind of potential equal power of consumers in their
initial endowments. If you keep the complementarities but change the endowments then global instability
no longer prevails. These contributions are important in themselves in adding to our understanding of what
we expect to be true theoretically.
However, this economy is also interesting for empirical and normative issues. It analyse situations in
which decision units have a few shared peculiar features.
The obvious Pareto optimum is equal utility for the individuals. But there are many others in which
there is a single top dog and the other two individuals are second class citizens.
We show that markets are actually quite exible in this setting. For many initial endowments we dene
three di¤erent types of congurations of prices that will implement the equal utility optimum. Similarly there
are prices that will implement the top dog/second class citizen Pareto optima for many initial endowments.
Moreover when there is a top dog in the sense we dene the market equilibrium supporting the unequal
Pareto optimum has strong stability properties. However the source of a top dog is essentially in the
initial endowment distribution, and with Scarf preferences prices cannot overcome the basic inequality in
the endowment distribution.
The key result is that if one individual is strictly better o¤ than others then one of the goods at least
partially is not fully consumed in aggregate and the market equilibrium entails a zero price for that good. For
this to be possible we cannot have the case in which one individual has an initial endowment consisting only
of the good with a zero price unless we are looking at the Pareto optimum in which two of the individuals
receive zero utility. Thus if the usual unpleasant case of equilibrium occurs in which one individual is rationed
out of markets by prices, then at least he has some company.
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A Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
Suppose that
X1 + Y1 + (1    )Z1 = (1  )=2
X2 + Y2 + (1    )Z2 = (1  )=2
Summing these
(X1 +X2) + (Y1 + Y2) + (1    )(Z1 + Z2) = 1  =2  =2
But there is an aggregate endowment of unity of each good so this implies
(1 X3) + (1  Y3) + (1    )(1  Z3) = 1  =2  =2
and rearranging this we derive
X3 + Y3 + (1    )Z3 = =2 + =2

Proof of Proposition 2 (Case with di¤erent prices)
a) Suppose that the price are unequal and such that: px = ; py =  and (1      ) = pz; with
0<1     > 1; and 0 <  6=  6=  < 1. The equations (1) become:
fy1 =
X1 + Y1 + (1    )Z1
(1  ) = 1=2
fx2 =
X2 + Y2 + (1    )Z2
(1  ) = 1=2
which imply:
X1 + Y1 + Z1 = 
X2 + Y2 + Z2 = 1
where  = 1=2(1  ), 1 = 1=2(1  ) and  = 1     > 0:
(b) Conversely suppose the conditions (2) hold. Then we have to show that this implies that px = ; py =
: Again multiplying through (1) we get the linear system
pxX1 + pyY1 + (1  px   py)Z1 = (1  px)=2
pxX2 + pyY2 + (1  px   py)Z2 = (1  py)=2
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Solving these linear equations we get
py =  
(  12X2 + Z1X2 + 12X1   Z2X1   12Z1 + 14 )
(Y2X1   Y2Z1 + 12Y2   Z2X1   12Z2 + 12X1   12Z1 + 14 + Y1Z2   Y1X2 + Z1X2)
(19)
px =
(Y2   Z2 + 14   Z2Z1   12Y1 + Y1Z2)
(Y2X1   Y2Z1 + 12Y2   Z2X1   12Z2 + 12X1   12Z1 + 14 + Y1Z2   Y1X2 + Z1X2)
This solution requires that the determinant condition
(Y2X1   Y2Z1 + 1
2
Y2   Z2X1   1
2
Z2 +
1
2
X1   1
2
Z1 +
1
4
+ Y1Z2   Y1X2 + Z1X2) 6= 0
should hold.
Imposing the general Hirota conditions (2)
X1 = (
 Y1   Z1 + 

)
X2 = (
 Y2   Z2 + 1

)
and substituting in (19) gives px = ; py = . 
Proof of Proposition 4 (Case with proportional prices)
Suppose that the two prices are equal and such that: px = ; py = 2and (1 3) = pz; with 0 <  < 1=3.
The equations (1) become:
fy1 =
(X1 + 2Y1) + (1  3)Z1
(1  ) = 1=2
fx2 =
(X2 + 2Y2) + (1  3)Z2
(1  2) = 1=2
which imply:
(X1 + 2Y1) + Z1 = 
(X2 + 2Y2) + Z2 = 1
where  = 1=2(1  ), 1 = 1=2(1  2) and  = 1  3 > 0:
(b) Conversely suppose the endowment conditions (6) hold. Then we have to show that this implies that
px = ; py = 2: Again multiplying through (1) we get the linear system
pxX1 + pyY1 + (1  px   py)Z1 = (1  px)=2
pxX2 + pyY2 + (1  px   py)Z2 = (1  py)=2
Solving these linear equations we get
py =  
(  12X2 + Z1X2 + 12X1   Z2X1   12Z1 + 14 )
(Y2X1   Y2Z1 + 12Y2   Z2X1   12Z2 + 12X1   12Z1 + 14 + Y1Z2   Y1X2 + Z1X2)
px =
(Y2   Z2 + 14   Z2Z1   12Y1 + Y1Z2)
(Y2X1   Y2Z1 + 12Y2   Z2X1   12Z2 + 12X1   12Z1 + 14 + Y1Z2   Y1X2 + Z1X2)
This solution requires that the determinant condition
(Y2X1   Y2Z1 + 1
2
Y2   Z2X1   1
2
Z2 +
1
2
X1   1
2
Z1 +
1
4
+ Y1Z2   Y1X2 + Z1X2) 6= 0
should hold.
Imposing the conditions (8)
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X1 = (
 2Y1   (1  3)Z1 + 

)
X2 = (
 2Y2   (1  3)Z2 + 1

)
and substituting in (19) gives px = , py = 2 and pz =(1  3)
Proof of Proposition 5 (Case with two equal prices)
a) Suppose that the two prices are equal and such that: px = py = ; and (1 2) = pz; with 0 <  < 1=2.
The equations (1) become:
fy1 =
(X1 + Y1) + (1  2)Z1
(1  ) = 1=2
fx2 =
(X2 + Y2) + (1  2)Z2
(1  ) = 1=2
which imply:
(X1 + Y1) + Z1 =  (20)
(X2 + Y2) + Z2 = 1
where  = 1=2(1  ), 1 = 1=2(1  ) and  = 1  2 > 0:
(b) Conversely suppose that (9) hold. Then we have to show that this implies that px = ; py = : Again
multiplying through (1) we get the linear system
pxX1 + pyY1 + (1  px   py)Z1 = (1  px)=2
pxX2 + pyY2 + (1  px   py)Z2 = (1  py)=2
Solving these linear equations we get
py =  
(  12X2 + Z1X2 + 12X1   Z2X1   12Z1 + 14 )
(Y2X1   Y2Z1 + 12Y2   Z2X1   12Z2 + 12X1   12Z1 + 14 + Y1Z2   Y1X2 + Z1X2)
px =
(Y2   Z2 + 14   Z2Z1   12Y1 + Y1Z2)
(Y2X1   Y2Z1 + 12Y2   Z2X1   12Z2 + 12X1   12Z1 + 14 + Y1Z2   Y1X2 + Z1X2)
This solution requires that the determinant condition
(Y2X1   Y2Z1 + 1
2
Y2   Z2X1   1
2
Z2 +
1
2
X1   1
2
Z1 +
1
4
+ Y1Z2   Y1X2 + Z1X2) 6= 0
should hold.
Imposing the conditions (9)
X1 = (
 Y1   (1  2)Z1 + 

)
X2 = (
 aY2   (1  2)Z2 + 1

);
and substituting in (19) gives px = py =  and pz =(1  2)
Proof of Proposition 6 (Case with equal prices)
(a) When we have equal prices the equations (1) become
fy1 =
X1 + Y1 + Z1
2
= 1=2
fx2 =
X2 + Y2 + Z2
2
= 1=2
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which imply
X1 + Y1 + Z1 = 1
X2 + Y2 + Z2 = 1
then using the Lemma we also have X3 + Y3 + Z3 = 1 and so equilibrium with prices all equal imply that
the Hirota conditions hold.
(b) Conversely suppose the Hirota conditions hold. Then we have to show that this implies that px =
py = 1=3: Again multiplying through (1) we get the linear system
pxX1 + pyY1 + (1  px   py)Z1 = (1  px)=2
pxX2 + pyY2 + (1  px   py)Z2 = (1  py)=2
Solving these linear equations we get
py =  
(  12X2 + Z1X2 + 12X1   Z2X1   12Z1 + 14 )
(Y2X1   Y2Z1 + 12Y2   Z2X1   12Z2 + 12X1   12Z1 + 14 + Y1Z2   Y1X2 + Z1X2)
px =
(Y2   Z2 + 14   Z2Z1   12Y1 + Y1Z2)
(Y2X1   Y2Z1 + 12Y2   Z2X1   12Z2 + 12X1   12Z1 + 14 + Y1Z2   Y1X2 + Z1X2)
This solution requires that the determinant condition
(Y2X1   Y2Z1 + 1
2
Y2   Z2X1   1
2
Z2 +
1
2
X1   1
2
Z1 +
1
4
+ Y1Z2   Y1X2 + Z1X2) 6= 0
should hold.
Imposing the Hirota conditions
X1 = 1  Y1   Z1;Y2 := 1 X2   Z2
gives px = 1=3; py = 1=3. 
A.1 Stability of Equilibrium with Unequal Prices and Equal Utilities
The determinant of (18) when px =  and py =  is equal to
d =
((1  2Z2)(1  2Y1) + 2Y2(1  2Z1))(1    )
2(1  )(+ )(1  ) (21)
whose sign is given by that of (1  2Z2)(1  2Y1) + 2Y2(1  2Z1).
The trace is equal to
t =   (2
2 + 2   22      + )
a(1  a)(a+ )(1  ) Y1 (22)
  (+ 2
2   2   22   + )
a(1  a)(a+ )(1  ) Y2
  (2
2  22   1 + + 3   3)
a(1  a)(a+ )(1  ) Z2
  ( 2
2   2 + 22   1 + 2)
a(1  a)(a+ b)(1  b) Z1
  (1  + 2+ 
2   2   2)
(1  )(+ )(1  )
which we can write as
t =
Y1(   + 22)
(+ )(1  ) +
Y2(     22)
(1  )(+ )
  (2   1)Z2
(+ )
+
Z1(1     22)
(+ )(1  )  
(1  )
(+ )
This is of ambiguous sign.
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A.1.1 Proportional Prices
Substituting  = 2 in (21) and (22) we get:
d =
(1 + 4Y1Z2   2Y1   4Y2Z1   2Z2 + 2Y2)(1  3)
62(1  )(1  2)
and the trace:
t =
Y1(+ 2
2)
(1  )32 +
Y2(  82)
(1  2)32
  (4  1)Z2
32
+
Z1(1  2  2a2)
(1  )3  
(1  2)
32
Still the sign is ambiguous
A.1.2 Stability with two equal prices and equal utilities
1) General Case  = a: (21) and (22) become respectively:
d =
[(1  2Z2)(1  2Y1) + 2Y2(1  2Z1)](1  2)
42(  1)2
t =
(Y1   Y2)
(1  )  
Z2( 1 + 2)
22
+
Z1(1  2)(+ 1)
22(1  a)  
(1  )
22
2) Equal endowments of each good for individuals 1; 2 (X1 = X2; Y1 = Y2, Z2 = Z1): This case is always
stable.
Note that with equal endowments for the rst two individuals, each endowment is at most equal to 1=2;
i.e. X1  1=2; Y1  1=2, Z1  1=2: The determinant is:
d =
(2Z2   1)(2  1)
42(  1)2
which is always positive since (2  1) < 0 and (2Z2   1) < 0:
The trace becomes:
t =
4Z2  2+ 2   2Z2 + 1
22(  1)
=
2 + (1  2Z2)(1  2)
22(  1)
that is always negative since (  1) < 0; 1  2Z2 > 0 and 1  2 > 0:
3) Equal endowments of Z for individuals 1; 2 Z1 = Z2:
d =
 (1  2Z2)(1  2(Y1   Y2))( 1 + 2)
42( 1 + )2
Since (2   1) < 1 and 1   2Z2 > 0; the determinant is positive if (1   2(Y1   Y2) > 0: This holds if
Y2 > Y1 or if Y1 < 1=2:
t =
(Y1   Y2)
(1  ) +
(2  1)Z2
2(  1)  
(1  )
22
The trace is certainly negative when the conditions that make the determinant positive hold.
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A.1.3 Stability with equal prices and equal utilities
In this case, Z1 = 1  Y1  X1;Z2 = 1  Y2  X2 and a = b = 1=3: The determinant is:
d =
27
14
( 1
4
+
1
2
Y1 +
1
2
X2  X2Y1 + Y2X1)
which is positive if:
X1Y2 > (
1
2
 X2)(1
2
  Y1)
The trace is:
t =
3
2
( Y1   2Y2 + 1 X2   2X1)
The trace is negative if
 Y1   2Y2 + 1 X2   2X1 < 0
We can combine (??) and (??) to derive an endowment restriction which is necessary and su¢ cient for local
stability of this case: we require
X2 > maxf1  2Y1   Y2   2X1; (2Y1   1=2)
2X1 + 1:  2Y1 g
if this fails we can for example have the determinant and trace both positive. For example take Y1 = Y2 = 1
and X1 = :05; X2 = :45: Then (??) is :0025 and (??) is 0:15.
A.2 Stability with unequal utilities
A.2.1 Stability for any initial conditions starting with px = 0
In the more general case with equilibrium prices py = k; pz = 1  k, the endowment becomes
Y2 = ((1  k)=k)(a  Z2);Z3 = (k=(1  k))(a  Y3);
Y1 = 1=k[1  a  (1  k)Z1]
Z1 = 1  Z2   Z3
Ey =
(py(1  k)(a  Z2))=k + (1  py)Z2)
(1  py) +
pyY3 +
(1 py)(a Y3)k
1 k
py
  1
Computing its derivative and evaluating at py = k
@Ey
@py
=
 2a+ Y3 + Z2
k
< 0 (23)
The equilibrium is always stable since (Y3   a) < 0 and (Z2   a) < 0.
As an example we know that a Pareto optimum with unequal utilities can be supported as an equilibrium
with two equal prices py = pz = 1=2 when the endowment distribution is:
Y1 = 2  2a  Z1; Y2 = a  Z2;Y3 = a  Z3
With this endowment distribution, the excess demand function for y has the form
Ey = py(2  2a  Z1) + (1  py)Z1 + py(a  Z3) + (1  py)Z3
py
  1
Then
@Ey
@py
= 2  2a  2Z1   Z3
p2y
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We should evaluate it at the equilibrium: py = 1=2
@Ey
@py
= 2  2a  2Z1   4Z3 < 0 (24)
Note that 2(1  Z1   Z3) = 2Z2. Thus (24) becomes: 2( a+ Z2   Z3) < 0 since Z2   a < 0 (Y2 cannot
be negative).
A.2.2 Stability for arbitrary initial conditions
The determinant of (18) when px = k, py = 1  k and Y1 = ( (1  k)Z1 + (1  a))=k; Y2 = ( (1  k)Z2 +
(1  k)a)=k is
d =
a[2(X1 +X2)(1  k) + k   2(1 + Z2)] + 2a2   2(1  k)[(Z2X1   Z1X2 +X2)] + (1  Z1 + Z2)])
k2(1  k)
The trace is equal to
t =
k2(2a  1 + 2X2   2Z2 +X1) + k(2(1  a)  Z1  X2  X1))  1 + Z1 + Z2
k2(1  k)
The sign of the trace and of the determinant are ambiguous.
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